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Abstract. We investigate knowledge exchange among commercial organisations, the rationale behind it and its e®ects
on the market. Knowledge exchange is known to be bene¯cial for industry, but in order to explain it, authors have used
high level concepts like network e®ects, reputation and trust. We attempt to formalise a plausible and elegant explanation
of how and why companies adopt information exchange and why it bene¯ts the market as a whole when this happens.
This explanation is based on a multi-agent model that simulates a market. Even though the model does not include any
high-level concepts, information exchange naturally emerges during simulations as a successful pro¯table behaviour. The
conclusions reached by this agent-based analysis are twofold: (1) A straightforward set of assumptions is enough to give
rise to exchange in a software market. (2) Knowledge exchange is shown to increase the e±ciency of the market.
1. Introduction
The growth of the Internet as a medium of knowledge exchange has stimulated a lot of scienti¯c interest originating
from various disciplines. The willingness of individuals, organisations as well as ¯rms to share information via the Internet
has been remarkable. In some sectors like scienti¯c research, the communication of newly acquired knowledge in a ¯eld
is considered vital for their advancement. On the other hand, in other sectors, the bene¯ts of such exchanges may not
be obvious. For instance, it might be considered damaging for pharmaceutical ¯rms to make public any innovations
generated by their research and development (R&D) process. In spite of this view, exchange of intellectual property in
some industries occurs frequently and in various di®erent ways. These include the forming of strategic partnerships, the
participation in open source software projects and the publication of scienti¯c papers by research labs that are part of
commercial ¯rms. In existing literature, [Hagedoorn, 2002], [Lerner and Tirole, 2002] and others justify the decisions of
companies to share some of their knowledge using the concepts like trust, network e®ects and strategic reasons.
We focus on analysing the rationale behind this exchange as well as its e®ect to the market. This e®ort ¯ts within the
framework of the Digital Business Ecosystem (DBE) project [DBE, 2002]. The DBE project is an attempt to develop a
distributed environment which will interlink European Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and foster collaboration
between them.
We are interested in analysing the global system properties which emerge from the interactions that occur in a market.
We have been using techniques from agent based modelling to simulate the DBE environment. The main aspects of the
DBE market are captured in a model where the ¯rms are agents with bounded rationality. This model is then studied
using simulations and a number of observations are made. One of the most interesting observations is that exchanges
between the agents similar to the ones that happen in real-life arise in the system. This behaviour emerges in the market
even though the model does not explicitly account for social issues of trust, network e®ects or managerial strategies.
2. An agent-based model of the DBE
Companies are modelled as agents in a multi-agent system. The services the companies provide are modelled as bit
strings, with each bit symbolising a feature of the service. Finally, the underlying market is modelled by a set of requests
(market needs). A request is a bit string of the same size as a service bit string.
Each company has a population (or portfolio) of services. This population is not static throughout the lifetime of the
company. If a service is successful, the company tends to add similar services to the portfolio while unsuccessful services
are discarded. The whole process is modelled quite elegantly by a Genetic Algorithm within the portfolio which involves
mutation and crossover with survival of the ¯ttest. Through this population each company can choose which market
segment(s) it will try to satisfy. The Genetic Algorithm (GA) represents the R&D businesses perform in order to improve
their services.
The ¯tness of a company equals the ¯tness of the service it o®ers. The ¯tness of a service measures how pro¯table it
is to its owner. The pro¯tability of a service depends on: (1)how close the service is to the market needs (service-request
similarity) and (2)how many other services satisfy those needs (limited demand).
In our model, the exchange involves selecting a set of services from one company's portfolio and swapping them with
the corresponding set of services of the other company's portfolio. At each time tick, the companies are asked to make
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two decisions. Firstly, they need to decide whether they want to exchange some of their services with one of the other
companies. Then, in the case that they have decided to exchange, they need to decide with which fellow company to
exchange. A statistical classi¯cation algorithm, similar to the one used in [Kirman and Vriend, 2001], is used to model
each of the decision problems an individual agent faces.
3. Summary of results
Simulations of the model outlined above were performed for a very wide range of parameters and initial conditions.
The model behaviour, which is quite general, is summarised in this section. The details of the experiments performed as
well as graphs and ¯gures have been omitted here for brevity, but will be included in the full paper.
The ¯rst observation, which is justi¯ed by a series of experiments, is that the practice of information sharing emerges
in the market as long as the companies' decisions on whether to exchange is based on their performance in the market.
More speci¯cally, it shown that it is more bene¯cial for the worst performing companies in the market to participate in
knowledge exchange activities. In addition to that, our experiments show that it is most bene¯cial for worst performing
companies to engage in exchanges with the best performing ones. While this might an obvious result, it justi¯es the
validity of our model. Another less obvious fact which was observed is that it is very bene¯cial for the worst performing
companies in the market to engage in exchanges among themselves. Such exchanges were shown to have tremendous e®ects
to the performance of the companies involved and even bring about changes in the leadership of the market. Finally, it
is shown that when sharing of information is allowed in the market it makes for greater market e±ciency levels.
4. Concluding remarks
The aim of this work has been to study the rationale as well as the e®ect of knowledge exchange in economic markets.
Sharing of information between commercial ¯rms is considered controversial. Although it is acknowledged that when two
companies join forces to develop an innovative product they can both bene¯t, sharing trade secrets is not undertaken
lightly. Our main aim has been to formalise a plausible and elegant explanation of how and why companies adopt
information exchange and why it bene¯ts the market as a whole when this happens.
An agent based model of a Digital Business Ecosystem market has been implemented to assist us in understanding the
dynamics of the market mechanisms. Firms are modelled as agents with minimal reasoning capabilities. We investigated
the properties that emerge from the agent interactions that occur in the market. Speci¯cally, we examined two key
characteristics that we observed in the simulations carried out. Namely, the fact that the agents discover themselves that
under certain circumstances it is bene¯cial for them to exchange services and that allowing exchange to take place in the
market, makes for greater market e±ciency levels.
The technologic infrastructure of the DBE will facilitate the dissemination of knowledge among the member companies,
increasing the volume and the speed of the information °owing in the market. As a result, it is expected that it will
allow for greater market e±ciency levels in comparison to a conventional market. Admittedly, it is di±cult to compare
the market e±ciency of two di®erent markets. However, an interesting result arose when we performed simulations of
the DBE contrasting settings in which exchanges among companies were permitted with settings where exchanges were
not permitted. Exchanges among companies within the DBE further increase the e±ciency of the market, which is in
agreement with the common intuition that exchanging information is ultimately bene¯cial for the entire market.
The second and most important conclusion that emerged from the DBE simulation is that exchanges between the
agents similar to the ones that happen in real-life arise naturally in our system. At regular time intervals, the ¯rms were
given the chance to decide whether they wanted to choose a partner and swap some of their services. The decision was
taken using classi¯ers, which were separate for each agent. The agents were not pre-programmed or biased in any way to
engage in exchanges. The companies, on their own, discovered in which cases exchanging is bene¯cial for them and what
type of partner is the best. Exchange is a practice that emerges, and is not forced upon the agents.
This work does not directly advocate service knowledge as a means of increasing pro¯tability of software companies.
Knowledge exchange, is indeed an already existing phenomenon in industry. The results presented merely serve as a
demonstration of a parsimonious set of assumptions that give rise to exchange in a software market. In other words, we
identify the substance of this phenomenon, ridding it from unnecessary assumptions, like network e®ects, social issues of
trust, or managerial strategies and show the minimal set of assumptions that allow it to emerge.
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